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and ‘Knowing Better’ in  
Peter Carey’s My Life as a Fake
Lewis MacLeod
Culture [is] the great human invention […] the greatest of 
them all; a meta-invention, an invention setting inventiveness 
in motion and making all other inventions possible.
Zygmunt Bauman (Wasted 97)
In the real world, Peter Carey’s My Life as a Fake finds it origins in a 
furious indictment of both provincialism and inferior aesthetic tastes. 
In 1944, two Australian poets, James McAuley and Harold Stewart, 
frustrated with what they perceived to be the inferior quality and shal-
low faddishness of their country’s aping of high modern poetry, sur-
reptitiously submitted a collection of gibberish poems, The Darkening 
Ecliptic, to one of the country’s leading journals, Angry Penguins. The 
poems arrived with a letter from the non-existent poet’s non-existent 
sister claiming they were the work of her recently deceased brother, 
a bike mechanic named Ern Malley. The poems were duly accepted 
and Stewart and McAuley rejoiced at having demonstrated that the 
Australia’s emperor of modernist aesthetics, editor Max Harris, had no 
clothes.They seemed to have shown that a supposedly sophisticated and 
influential taste-maker could not tell a good poem from a bad joke. In 
one decisive move, Harris and his acolytes lost their credentials to cos-
mopolitan good taste, and urbane sophisticates were compelled to play 
the role of clueless and gullible rubes.
The nature of aesthetic sophistication and the relationship between 
good taste and provincialism are central to the historical Ern Malley 
hoax, the fictional My Life as a Fake and to the intellectual discourse of 
cosmopolitanism in general. Despite its loud calls for “inclusive, egali-
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tarian heterogeneity” (Dharwadker 7), cosmopolitanism’s stand “against 
parochialisms” (Anderson 267) entails at least a flirtation with the elit-
ist, even imperialist, discourses it purports to critique. Leela Gandhi’s 
description of the imperial encounter applies to cosmopolitan aesthetics 
insofar as cosmopolitanism tends to produce conversations in which 
“one of the participants invariably ‘knows better’ than the other, whose 
worldview must be modified or ‘improved’” (28). Bluntly, citizens of 
the world must teach primitive tribalists to think on a larger, more en-
lightened, scale. The disciplinary “flow” (Wars of Position 208) of cosmo-
politanism’s apparently eclectic conversations, Timothy Brennan argues, 
is such that cosmopolitan “hybridity itself [becomes] a coercive lesson 
imposed on outlying populations” (Wars of Position 206) by a self-satis-
fied centre. The European avant-garde might have felt “out there” and 
peripheral in London, Paris and Berlin, but its apparently dissembling 
procedures also functioned as an “educative spectacle” (Wars of Position 
206) in far-off Australia, a spectacle enacted and managed by a centre 
which was often too sophisticated (or too disingenuous) to acknowledge 
itself as such. It took something as dramatic as the Ern Malley hoax to 
make these power relations (enacted through aesthetics) clear.1
Vinay Dharwadker has argued that the critical “return to cosmopoli-
tanism has been freighted with politics rather than aesthetics” (2), yet 
recourse to good taste (a strategy that amounts to “sophisticated abuse”) 
pervades cosmopolitan discourse to such a degree that even racism 
sometimes registers as gauche more than politically or morally wrong. 
“The cosmopolite,” Ghassan Hage reminds us, “is a class figure […] ca-
pable of appreciating and consuming ‘high-quality’ commodities and 
cultures” (201). Without the ability to differentiate “high” from “low” 
quality, the claim to cosmopolitan good taste disappears, and once this 
claim evaporates its numerous attendant advantages come under pres-
sure. What is unique about the Ern Malley scenario is the degree to 
which (or perhaps the very brief timescale in which) the disciplinary cul-
tural voices of those who “know better” start to sound like know noth-
ing voices who would do well to defer to their betters. In McAuley and 
Stewart’s terms, the Australian devotee of European High Modernism, 
far from being a taste-making arbiter of aesthetic value, becomes instead 
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a blinkered and parochial “devotee insensible of absurdity and incapable 
of ordinary discrimination” (McAuley and Stewart 4). 
The move from high to low, from elite to ordinary is hard to miss, 
as are the geographic and political implications of being assigned one 
or the other group. Before the hoax is revealed, Harris commands the 
refracted cultural authority of Europe. Afterwards, he is a second class 
Australian. Brennan sees this “spilling over of the cultural into the po-
litical [as] endemic to cosmopolitanism’s functionality” (Wars of Position 
218). Cosmopolitanism’s “political utopia,” he claims, “is constructed as 
aesthetic taste” (218). The underacknowledged and didactic project of 
cultural improvement that motivates much of cosmopolitan discourse 
fuels the majority of the action in Carey’s novel as a crew of self-con-
scious sophisticates struggles to be both elemental (local, connected) 
and elevated (learned, smart, sophisticated); they want to be alive to 
aesthetic innovation (cutting edge) but impervious to fads which would 
reveal them as gullible and naive. Questions of taste are pervasive in the 
novel and offer important glimpses into the challenges facing cosmo-
politan aesthetics. In My Life as a Fake, no mere human can manage 
to balance cosmopolitanism’s desire to be “local while denying its local 
character” (Wars of Position 204). Nobody can to be “classy” while still 
being “street.” It takes a supernatural being, a great artist and/or a fake 
to reconcile the forces which underlie cosmopolitanism’s “aesthetically 
enjoyable cultural mixing” (Robbins, “New and Newer” 59).
I. Disposable Objects Designed For Immediate Obsolescence: Of 
Aesthetics and Time
In The Cosmopolitan Novel, Berthold Schoene argues that “nations are 
inclined to assert themselves most vehemently when their boundaries 
are drawn into doubt by being revealed as porous, arbitrary or transi-
ent[;]a fierce vying for predominance is set in motion” (9) when ap-
parently rigid categories begin to break down. Cultural territories are 
subject to the same anxieties as nations, and a hoax of the Ern Malley 
type demonstrates the fretful militancy that arises when self-identified 
cosmopolitan sophisticates find their prized territories under siege. If 
we imagine culture as a “sacred” space clearly demarcated from “the 
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coarse, vulgar, venal [and] servile” (Bourdieu 7), then any unsanctioned 
incursion of “the low” into the territory of “the high” (as when self-con-
sciously bad poems are mistaken for high quality aesthetic innovations) 
amounts to a significant transgression in need of redress. Determined to 
mark the boundary between bogus and legitimate (fake and real) works 
of art, the possessors of good taste (those who know what “any educated 
person would know” [Carey 39]) cannot afford to have their authority 
called into question, yet this authority simultaneously depends upon an 
openness to new and unanticipated things. As a result, they must fear 
entrenchment and faddishness at one and the same time. They appear 
“all posh and frosty” but carry fears of being proven “an utter fool” 
(Carey 243). 
This anxiety is particularly pronounced under the conditions of post-
modernity, where what’s at stake is nothing less than the nature, dur-
ation and reception of aesthetic objects.2 Of particular importance is 
the cultural value assigned to innovation. Faced with what Zygmunt 
Bauman calls “liquid modernity,” we confront a contemporary life 
which “dissembles” time so that it is “no more a vector, no more an 
arrow with a pointer or a flow with a direction” (Discontents 89). The 
result, Bauman claims, is that life no longer feels like a sustained jour-
ney or a pilgrimage, but rather “a loose assembly, an arbitrary sequence” 
(Discontents 89). In a context in which the “world constructed of du-
rable objects [has been] replaced with disposable products designed for 
immediate obsolescence” (Liquid Modernity 85) cultural artefacts and 
works of art seem to be subjected to the same detemporalization and 
improvisational attitudes as everything else. In an amnesiac culture, 
Bauman argues, newness displaces “greatness” as a primary determinant 
for artistic success, and in place of beauty we get fashion. If in the past 
great works of art seemed to declare that “the things that man creates 
[…] are of lasting worth and meaning, that they outlive and outshine 
death and decay” (Ernest Becker qtd in Bauman, Wasted 97), they now 
operate in a more generalized economy in which “today’s useful and in-
dispensable objects […] are tomorrow’s waste” (Bauman, Wasted 97). As 
Bauman recognizes, the ubiquitous nature of lists proclaiming “What’s 
Hot” and “What’s Not” make this very plain. The result of all this is that 
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“the link between eternity and beauty, aesthetic value and durability” 
(Wasted 118) collapses, and, for Bauman at least, “beauty, in its ortho-
dox meaning [as] an ideal to strive for and to die for, seems to have fallen 
on hard times” (Wasted 117).
Such a context presents serious problems for the champions of good 
taste because the conditions under which one might be said to build 
aesthetic competence (in the traditional sense) have been so thoroughly 
undermined. If, with Bourdieu, we imagine a work of art to have mean-
ing and value only to “someone who possesses the cultural competence 
[…] into which it is encoded” (2), what happens when the notion of 
competence itself is under threat by a timescale which precludes anybody 
from clearly possessing the necessary codes? If no structure is expected 
to endure, no argument for accumulated expertise can be sustained, and 
we seem to collapse into a heterogeneity and egalitarianism so complete 
that nothing gets to be “good” for very long for very many people. 
Bauman’s argument sounds like a pretty conservative and nostalgic 
lament, and it does fit well with the conservative intentions of McAuley 
and Stewart.3 Clearly, they regarded modernism as a “what’s hot” type 
of fad and felt that any claim to sophisticated good taste derived from 
modernism was necessarily fraudulent. In place of modernist aesthetics, 
they championed instead the values of “harmony, proportion, symmetry 
[and] order” (Bauman, Wasted 113), values they located in all great art 
throughout history: no improvisation or bricolage here. With Bauman, 
they believed that sound aesthetic judgment required a long view of his-
tory, that what’s considered good today ought to be weighed against the 
standards of the past and imagined in terms of a very distant future. In 
this construction both time and the desire for timelessness are necessary 
preconditions for beauty and necessary preoccupations for those who 
purport to assess it. Without past and future, beauty disappears and 
good taste becomes unintelligible.
Still, some people like it!
In apparently sharp contrast to the above, Schoene sees the perpetual 
present as both a political defence against modernity’s totalizing am-
bitions and as a way of resisting staid conventions that hinder great 
art. For Bauman, great art is the art which “will never lose its value, 
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never be redundant, will never be disposed of and so will never turn 
to waste—instead it is all further search and experimenting that will 
from now on be redundant” (Wasted 114). For Schoene, however, the 
“novelty” of the novel is its great strength; search and experimentation 
are the name of the game, and game-changing is the sign of genius. 
There’s not much time for harmony of design and symmetrical struc-
tures in Schoene’s enthusiastic description of a cosmopolitan art in 
which “compositeness forges narrative assemblage out of a seemingly 
desultory dispersion of plot and characterization” (14), an aesthetic of 
“differently paced and oriented trajectories” (14) bumping up against 
each other in “edgy, boxed in solipsism” (14). In place of any pursuit 
of eternal value, Schoene champions a cosmopolitan culture in which 
“everyday life in the present is prioritized over the pursuit of any grand 
utopian designs of unanimity or perfection” (18); in place of long-term 
apprenticeships, he calls for “a radical unlearning of all definitive modes 
of identification” (21).
What we have here, then, are two totally antithetical visions both of 
what constitutes aesthetic value (idiosyncratic innovation or proportion 
and harmony) and of the timescale in which it is to be evaluated (the 
perpetual present or with a view toward eternity). What is the same for 
both Bauman and Schoene, however, is the implicit and didactic appeal 
to good taste. Each has a belief that he has the authority to frame and 
outline what’s good and what’s not. Although Schoene is opposed to 
the pursuit of unanimity and perfection, he maintains his pretty un-
ambiguous status as an arbiter of what’s aesthetically good and what’s 
not. Despite both an emphasis on an inclusive unlearning of identity 
and a high volume affirmation of “deconstructive diversification and 
renewal” (31), Schoene can’t help but resort to hierarchized opposition 
between a valorized art of the “singular, privately secluded mind” (184) 
of a true artist and the vulgarized commercialism he finds in “conglom-
erates of hot-desking studios sponsored by the state and/or corporatist 
power”(184). Art of the latter type, he makes clear, is in very bad taste. 
Novels Schoene doesn’t like are “of no consequence, devoid of truth, 
beauty and community” (185). The ones he likes have vast amounts of 
all three. Perhaps more problematically, given the primacy of the per-
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petual present in Schoene’s vision of the cosmopolitan, the books he 
doesn’t like are condemned for their lack of durability; they’re “entirely 
forgettable airport reads” (185).
What becomes clear here is a problem inherent in what Bruce Robbins 
calls the “very partial universalism” (29) of cosmopolitanism. No matter 
how we rework our standards (or even if we advocate abandoning 
them), both the appeal to sophisticated good taste and the implicit con-
demnation of the bad taste and parochialism of others persist. Crudely, 
Bauman and Schoene might disagree about how time functions and 
how bleak contemporary culture looks, but they agree when it comes 
to truth and beauty. They both know where real aesthetic value is and 
where it isn’t, and they can’t believe so many other people are taken in 
by fakes. 
II. Trusting My Taste: Cosmopolitan Aesthetics and Vulgarism
In My Life as a Fake, Carey’s protagonist, Sarah Wode-Douglas, is often 
at “the limits of [her] social confidence” (15), but she is never unsure 
of her position as cultural arbiter. As “the editor of an internationally 
respected poetry journal” (35) Sarah faces the good taste dilemma on a 
daily basis. Her accumulated expertise isn’t easily reconcilable with an 
instinct toward innovation, and so she feels a simultaneous desire both 
to oversee the cultural landscape and to yield to an unanticipated-yet-
elemental, transcendental-yet-visceral mode of art and life.4 The tension 
between these two impulses is encapsulated nicely when, upon reading 
a new poem, she says: “If I can trust anything it is my taste—or, to risk 
a vulgarism, my heart” (35). This construction speaks to cosmopolitan-
ism’s twin anxieties about elitism and naïve populism. Here, Sarah seeks 
both the appeal of elevated, aesthetic detachment (her good taste) and 
to recognize the impact of the poem at a more elemental and direct 
level (her heart). To risk a vulgarism is to abandon the safety of rarefied 
aesthetic evaluation and to participate instead in what the editors of 
Cosmopolitanism regard as the “vernacularization” (6) of contemporary 
culture, its move to street level. The effort to establish a link between 
learned, abstract aesthetic principles and the thumping and pumping of 
the human heart is the trick cosmopolitan artists and thinkers repeatedly 
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attempt, and, as I suggest above, it’s one that’s very difficult to get right. 
To revert to “the heart” or “the gut feeling” is to forego the structural 
advantage of “knowing better” than everybody else, but the necessarily 
distanced nature of elevated, impartial knowledge lacks the very blood 
the heart pumps, and it is exactly this bloodless quality that fuels Robert 
Pinsky’s complaint that the cosmopolitan fantasy would only be pos-
sible “if people were not driven by emotions” (87). For Sarah, at least, a 
world structured around high-end aesthetic contemplation and devoid 
of deep, daily emotional investments does seem possible; Carey doesn’t 
make it look especially attractive, though. Thoroughly detached from 
the world and entrenched in her role as literary editor, Sarah doesn’t risk 
vulgarism often enough; the result is that her wordliness often seems 
otherworldly. She’s so invested in the rarefied world of art that her daily 
life becomes empty and/or sterile.
Sarah opens the novel in first person, but, by the second sentence, she 
switches to a second person interrogative: “I have known John Slater all 
my life,” she says, “Perhaps you remember the public brawl with Dylan 
Thomas.” In the space of the next few pages, Sarah links John Slater, 
an English poet of Carey’s invention, with (at least) Unity Mitford, 
Robert Lowell, W.H. Auden, F.R. Leavis and Cyril Connelly. Through 
this process, Carey effectively punctures the boundedness of the novel’s 
fictional world, staging ontologically curious interactions between fic-
tional characters (who originate in his book) and historical personages 
many readers know to be “real” outside of it. More specifically, though, 
the second person “you” Sarah addresses is the possessor of a pretty 
detailed understanding of the (primarily, but not exclusively) British, 
mid-Century, literary-cultural milieu. The average North American 
English undergraduate stands a strong chance of running into Auden, 
a solid chance of running into Thomas and Lowell, and virtually no 
chance of running into Connelly or any Mitford. I don’t think Leavis 
has much of a chance anymore, either. Somebody with a university 
education, then, isn’t enough to qualify as Sarah’s addressee, a person 
with the cultural competence to decode the code. She requires people 
who can differentiate their Edith from their Osbert Sitwells, who know 
W.H. Auden as “Wystan.” 
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These august personages, of course, are approached and regarded as 
peers and friends to both Sarah and Slater, not as revered objects of 
study. The distinction between knowing about great literary figures and 
actually knowing them is clearly foregrounded throughout, and it’s not 
just any old everyman “you” she imagines; it’s a you she greets as a highly 
educated and sophisticated contemporary, someone who’ll know (and 
appreciate) what she means when she speaks of the tedium of “reading 
garbage for half your life” (21) and the frustrations of dealing with “a 
tin ear” (3).5 Sarah is not alone in her frustration with other people’s 
aesthetic and intellectual shortcomings, and many, perhaps most, of the 
novel’s major characters flirt with and/or embody the elitism dubious 
critics often associate with cosmopolitanism. 
III. Tourists and Vagabonds: On the Nature of Cosmopolitan Travel
Bauman has provocatively argued that “tourists and vagabonds are the 
metaphors of contemporary life” (Discontents 93). Like tourists and vag-
abonds, cosmopolitans often function outside any stable or inherited 
notion of “home,” yet there are clearly many different ways to have “no 
fixed address,” and cosmopolitans tend to have vexed relationships with 
both tourists and the homeless. On one hand, tourism represents an out-
ward-looking curiosity, a desire to embrace the diversity the world has 
to offer, a desire to transcend the insularity of local circumstances and 
allegiances. “When we travel in the cosmopolitan spirit,” K. Anthony 
Appiah says, we aspire (even if we can’t always manage) to move “in a 
spirit that celebrates and respects difference” (207). At the same time, 
however, tourism also seems to embody the worst aspects of global capi-
talism, exacerbating the differences between the happily hypermobile 
elites on permanent vacation, the tourists, and their hopelessly rootless 
subordinates, the vagabonds. “If the tourists move because they find 
the world irresistibly attractive,” Bauman claims, “the vagabonds move 
because they find the world unbearably inhospitable” (Discontents 92). 
My Life as a Fake demonstrates the varying strains of contemporary 
rootlessness, as its peripatetic procedures connect (but never assimilate 
the differences among) European “high” culture, Australian literary his-
tory and Malaysian national trauma. The novel takes place primarily in 
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Kuala Lampur, but none of the main characters is Malaysian. Everyone 
is from somewhere else and (with one notable exception) nobody is 
deeply connected with any other person. 
The primary difference between all these characters is agency. Some 
(Sarah and Slater) are “on holiday” and propped up by European fi-
nancing; others (Chubb, his estranged daughter, her adopted Chinese 
mother) have more or less “washed up” in the city and have no viable 
method of escape. What the novel reveals, then, are the different modes 
and motivations that underscore the movements of cosmopolitans, 
tourists and vagabonds. Everybody is seriously detached, but the char-
acters’ modes of detachment are decidedly different. 
Bruce Robbins links the cosmopolitan attitude to both “physical 
travel” and to a more figurative travel achieved through “thoughts and 
feelings entertained while one stays at home” (Cosmopolitics 4). Sarah’s 
worldliness is very much the latter type. By her own admission, she is 
“an awful tourist” (7) and she finds the streets and markets of Kuala 
Lampur overwhelming. Content to do her exploring through the words 
and experiences of others, she finds the unmediated experience of being 
alone on a bustling Kuala Lampur street to be disconcerting and un-
rewarding. Faced with what Schoene calls “the specific, unassimilable 
singularities of the local” (24), Sarah recognizes that she “actually [pre-
fers] to sit inside my hotel room and read” (11). She opts out of the 
pulsing vulgarism of the street and into both the neutered sterility of a 
hotel room and the stylized harmony of literature. Faced with the pros-
pect of adding what the advocates of constitutional patriotism call “sup-
plements of particularity” (Müller 100) to her more detached aesthetic 
pursuits, Sarah opts not just for “detachment from ordinary, provincial 
loyalties” (Anderson 268), but from any form of lived experience. She 
prefers a purchased space, a hotel room, that is just about the same eve-
rywhere in the world. Whatever else we might say about Sarah’s worldly 
refinement and detached sensibilities, she’s not a very good example of 
“a true cosmopolitanism from below” (Dharwadker 11). “I read,” Sarah 
says, “I have no other life” (7). 
Slater, in contrast, appears to have the “below” part of the con-
struction well-covered. He risks vulgarisms with vigour as an inveter-
45
Cosmopo l i t an  Ae s th e t i c s ,  Good  Ta s t e ,  and  ‘Knowing  Be t t e r ’
ate womanizer, boozer and traveler into shady regions. He is, in many 
ways, the quintessential (and/or nightmare) cosmopolitan male, some-
one who knows the local customs and the best restaurants wherever 
he goes (and who probably has a woman just about everywhere, as 
well). Unlike Sarah, he’s also very much at home with the joys and 
indignities of the human body. Sarah is appalled by the physical inti-
macy suggested by the hand-made and “roughly molded brown pills” 
(25) Chubb offers her to help her with her diarrhoea, and she treats 
them with great hesitation and suspicion. In contrast, Slater unself-
consciously gulps them “down without aid of water [while] standing 
in [an] open doorway” (34). He then goes on to chat freely about the 
“amoebic dysentery” (34) he went through on a previous trip. For 
Slater, bodily illness isn’t an embarrassing disclosure of physical weak-
ness, but a kind of credential, an anecdotal souvenir of an adventure. 
While Sarah retreats to her hotel room, Slater disappears from the city 
and returns with “a very detailed account of his hike through the jungle 
with an Anglophile Chinese poet” (12). 
He’s also, of course, a famous poet, and this seems to save his more 
dubious adventures (cutting a birthday cake with his hands, riding a 
horse into the kitchen, etc.) from the suggestion of straightforward buf-
foonery. More importantly, perhaps, he has a surprising and astute eye 
for the details of his surroundings. While Sarah cannot contend with the 
street, Slater is both thoroughly engaged in his local circumstances and 
informed by his learned good taste. The result is that he can spot “the 
1923 Insel-Verlag edition” of “Die Sonnette an Orpheus” (12) in some-
body’s hand as he is walking down the street. If Sarah exhibits many of 
the worst characteristics of a “thought only” cosmopolitanism devoid 
of lived experience, Slater seems to gain a lot from his physical move-
ment through different spaces, circumstances and cultures. He seems to 
embody both the attractiveness and sophistication of cosmopolitanism, 
balancing “recklessness and hedonism” (10) with sensitivity and refined 
good taste. If cosmopolitanism involves “a complex tension between 
elitism and egalitarianism” (Anderson 268), then Slater’s highbrow liter-
ary career and his lowbrow tastes for booze, women, and streetlife seem 
to resolve this tension in a pretty positive way. 
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But, in the end, they only seem to. His impressive social performances 
are also pretty shallow and pretty showy. Slater cuts a dashing figure 
and sees “cosmopolitanism as an attractive lifestyle option” (Schoene 7), 
but he is also chronically irresponsible and immature. He’s fun to have 
at parties, but you wouldn’t want to count on him to get you out of a 
difficult situation. As one of his ex-wives more succinctly puts it: “the 
thing about dear old Johnno [is] he always does exactly as he damn well 
likes” (10).
The multiple ex-wives, of course, speak to the compactness of Slater’s 
timescale, his preoccupation with the perpetual present, and his re-
luctance to build long term, durable relationships. More importantly, 
perhaps, this business of doing what one damn well likes haunts the dis-
course of cosmopolitanism, speaking to its “profound investment in the 
exceptional individualism of the intellectual class [and their] anomalous 
detachment from ordinary, provincial loyalties” (Anderson 268). Slater 
interacts with many cultures, but always in the “crypto-imperialist” (3) 
fashion Schoene condemns, and his easygoing manner might not be a 
sign of openness so much as impregnability. In Appiah’s terms, cosmo-
politan inclusiveness is often derived from the fact the world (even the 
“foreign” world) has been configured to the cosmopolitan’s advantage: 
“the ease with which we find ourselves taking pleasure in […] differ-
ence—the cosmopolite’s jouissance –reflects the fact that it has been pro-
duced in forms we have learned chez nous” (207). Slater’s assumed sense 
of advantage and superiority, his insulated sense of self-confidence, is 
a source of frustration to the bankrupt and marginalized Chubb, who 
makes explicit what Slater’s behaviour in Malaysia only implies: “You 
own us all, is that it?” (208). 
As he ages, Slater has no long term relationships, no stable employ-
ment and, perhaps most problematically, he has “betrayed his promise” 
(10) as a poet. More to the point, he has betrayed his talent through the 
very procedures of his cosmopolitanism. He lives his life in the present 
and engages energetically with a variety of local circumstances, but a 
lifetime of such behaviour has crowded out his career as a writer; “if he 
had written more and whored and sucked a little less”(10), Sarah con-
cludes, he would be happier and more fulfilled, less desperate for atten-
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tion, recognition, etc. Th is isn’t just Sarah’s sour grapes; it’s an opinion 
Slater shares. In a moment of self-disclosure, Slater despondently admits 
he has never written a great poem. Despite his manifold successes on the 
ground and in the present, and despite the barrenness of Sarah’s daily 
life, Sarah pities Slater at least as much as she envies him. Unable to con-
tradict Slater’s damning self-assessment of his failure as a poet, she has 
only “an awful thing to offer--sympathy” (166). The simultaneousness 
of Slater’s success as citizen of the world and his failure as a poet points 
to a disconnection between the easy sophistication of cosmopolitan 
travel/tourism and the difficulty of producing enduring cultural prod-
ucts and/or works of art. Insofar as John has allowed his life to become 
his art, he has surrendered his art to the “nowness” of cosmopolitanism. 
His poems were “hot” for a while a few decades ago, but even he knows 
they will not stand the test of time. As a result, he regards his otherwise 
rich life as something of a failure.
IV. The Chain of Being: Of Art and Ontology
Despite the differences in their life-strategies, then, and despite their 
respective failures in publishing and poetry, Sarah and Slater basically 
agree that the puny rewards of everyday life cannot compete with the 
epic achievements of great art. They believe that “nothing is unthinkable 
for poetry,” that poetry marks the territory of “civilised man,” and that 
“for a civilised man poetry is beyond diamonds” (243). Just as Bauman’s 
view toward eternity and Schoene’s perpetual present merge at the point 
of aesthetic assessment, both Sarah’s problematic cosmopolitanism 
of the mind and Slater’s presumptuous cosmopolitanism of the body 
merge when they venerate the great work of art above all else. Even 
though neither Sarah nor Slater achieves their stated aesthetic goal, the 
goal itself (of publishing and/or writing one truly great poem) remains 
in place throughout; in fact, it’s the only durable signpost in either of 
their lives. 
In this relentlessly cultured, art-oriented context, the term “civilised 
man” often seems like something of a redundancy. Civilization is what 
makes people human; to be uncivilized is to be less than human. To be 
more than just civilized, to be a great artist, is to approach the status of 
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a god. Nowhere is this hierarchy more apparent than in Christopher 
Chubb’s relationship with the purportedly fictional Bob McCorkle, 
Carey’s stand-in for Ern Malley. McCorkle is conceived as a hoax by 
Chubb, but he ultimately becomes real enough to permanently dis-
rupt Chubb’s life. When a real person appears in the world of the novel 
claiming to be Bob McCorkle, the reader originally assumes that s/he is 
simply encountering someone in the grip of a delusion, that the man is 
real, and the claim that he is McCorkle is false. As the novel continues, 
however, McCorkle’s ontological status becomes more and more confus-
ing; he gains ever-increasing amounts of ontological weight. In a context 
in which nothing is impossible for poetry, the “possibility that [Chubb] 
had, with his own pen, created blood and bone and a beating heart” 
(152) becomes more and more plausible. Bauman argues that we are 
now in a context characterized by an “underpowered institutionalization 
of differences” (Discontents 123), a scenario in which rigid boundaries 
and categorizations have collapsed. The result, he claims, is that the ap-
parent “givenness [and] obviousness, the ascribed and immutable nature 
of every man’s or woman’s place in the chain of being” (Discontents 122) 
is no longer solid. For him, the functional non-personhood of refugees, 
for example, speaks to the instability of their ontological station; in one 
sense, they’re obviously “real,” but they aren’t treated with any of the 
seriousness or respect associated with the status of “human.” Devoid 
of any claim to belong anywhere on the earth, they disappear from the 
community of humans even though their human bodies continue to 
present nasty “waste disposal” problems for the undeniably real citizens 
and governments of affluent nations.
Chubb’s descent from Australian literary provocateur to Malaysian 
vagrant marks his journey from real person to functional non-entity. 
Although obviously real in one sense, Chubb gradually loses his status 
as human, first when he comes to be regarded as a kind of devil or 
ghost, a hantu, then more prosaically when he finds himself destitute in 
Kuala Lampur. He sees only two possible returns to personhood, possi-
bilities which reveal both the functional non-personhood of vagabonds 
and the link between aesthetics and citizenship. First, he wants Sarah to 
“write him up” in her poetry journal, effectively positioning narrative 
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existence as structurally superior to bodily existence, recognizing that 
discursive affirmation in a “classy” venue must precede any affirmation 
or recognition of his crumbling body. Second, he thinks a new suit will 
save him from what Bauman calls “the nowhere land of non-humanity” 
(39). “You will think me such a beggar,” he tells Sarah, “but I could 
never afford another suit, not ever […] Without [a] suit I am trapped 
here until I die” (140). The suit, then, is a signifier not just of class, but 
of ontological position. Without it, he doesn’t exist. With it, he has a 
chance.6 Not surprisingly then, “real” people, those endowed with onto-
logical, financial and legal weight, regard Chubb’s attempt at ontological 
rehabilitation with scepticism. They are unwilling to permit Chubb to 
re-enter the realm of the human. When Sarah attempts to buy him the 
suit that will reconfigure his place in the chain of being, the shopkeeper 
says: “He not your friend. He not a person” (119).
McCorkle, by contrast, first becomes real, then almost mythic. 
Originating as a figment of Chubb’s imagination, he enters the narrative 
as a “wild man” (59), someone without language or culture and, more 
basically, without papers confirming his right to existence. Stuck in a 
legal and ontological no man’s land, a citizen of nowhere, the anguished 
McCorkle asks Chubb, “Do you know what it’s like to have no birth 
certificate?” (94). Spawned spontaneously from a cynical imagination, 
McCorkle enters the novel devoid of what Gertrude Himmelfarb calls 
“the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, his-
tory, culture, tradition, community—and nationality” (164). An on-
tological refugee in advance of his peculiar birth, McCorkle seeks to 
acquire what others are simply “given,” and this motivates a great deal 
of his behaviour. 
Once he gets a birth certificate, and thus a level of legal reality, 
McCorkle is able to obtain a passport and, from there, to begin his re-
markable, upward ontological progression: from imaginary non-entity, 
to paperless vagrant, to citizen, and, ultimately, to mythic creator. For 
him, the birth certificate is simultaneously an assertion of belonging 
and a gateway to elsewhere. It begins a move from the hopeless wander-
ing of the vagrant toward the self-directedness of cosmopolitan physical 
and intellectual mobility. Under the curious logic that governs citizen-
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ship, McCorkle can only leave Australia once he’s demonstrated he’s 
from Australia. With documents in hand, however, McCorkle is spared 
the fate of the refugee and travels from Australia to (at least) Indonesia 
and Malaysia.7 As he does so, he acquires languages, local knowledge 
and friends; more importantly, perhaps, he becomes a great poet. After 
many years of chasing McCorkle, Chubb comments, “He had overcome 
me. I had brought him ignorant into the world, but now he knew six 
languages, five of which I never heard of. [He was] so learned now. He 
knew the holy books of Buddha and Mohammed. He knew the name 
of everything that lived on the Malaysian earth” (250). This charac-
terization is instructive as it retains both high minded, even esoteric, 
learnedness and an emphatically earthy interest in how things work “on 
the ground.” This is precisely the balance that Sarah, Slater and Chubb 
can’t manage. As a result, McCorkle becomes the rarest of things: an 
engaged and connected cosmopolitan with aesthetic depth and without 
cosmopolitan pretensions. It speaks, perhaps, to the difficulties trou-
bling cosmopolitan aesthetics that it takes a miraculous birth to produce 
a culturally-aware, mobile, down-to-earth artist.8
In the context of the novel, at least, these reversals of fortune are re-
garded as somewhat just. If we value poetry above all else, then the great 
poet, McCorkle, ought to surpass the mediocre Chubb, whose obsession 
with the technicalities of poetic form (he loves, for example, the double 
sestina) renders his poetry devoid of energy and passion. Here again, we 
confront the opposition between good taste and pumping blood, a con-
flict not lost on Chubb himself. Aware that Sarah and Slater only toler-
ate him because of his connection with the prized McCorkle poems, 
Chubb sometimes attempts to pass off his own poems as McCorkle’s. 
He is always found out because the cynical sensibility that spawns the 
hoax is simultaneously overdetermined by its own sophistication; the 
problem with Chubb’s refined poems resides in the very learnedness and 
refinement that make them possible. Sarah says:
If this was his ‘real’ poetry, then I preferred the fake. True, 
these had none of the obfuscations that sometimes marred the 
‘McCorkle.’ Nor did it have its life, its wildness, its nasal pas-
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sion. Frankly, these dry yellow pages were priggish, self-serv-
ing, snobbish. The Poet in these verses was a paragon of art, of 
learning. (86)
The implications are clear. To be a paragon of art and learning is to be 
a bad poet, and poetry, not learning, has the price “beyond diamonds” 
(243). The bloodless quality of Chubb’s poems aligns them with the 
bloodlessness often attributed to cosmopolitanism, and, if whoring and 
sucking ruin Slater, Chubb’s determined sophistication ruins his work, 
and, by extension, his life. Sarah comments: Chubb “had been born 
into a second-rate culture, or so he thought, and one can see [in his 
poems] all the passion that later led to the birth of Bob McCorkle—a 
terror that he might be somehow tricked into admiring the second-rate, 
the derivative, the shallow, the provincial” (84). A child of the suburbs, 
Chubb is born on the margins of a city into a country on the margins 
of the cultural landscape, and his lifelong project of escaping his origins 
both underscores his poetic failure and comes back to haunt him in the 
form of his permanent vagrancy.9 Near the end of the novel, Chubb 
complains that he has become “a homeless traveller [although he] never 
wished to leave [his] street” (249), yet his repeated and excessive renun-
ciations of home (renunciations made in the name of a cosmopolitan 
sophistication) reveal the sense of entitlement attached to cosmopolitan 
movement; he always wanted to leave his street; he just didn’t expect to 
end up “on the street” in a foreign city.
In distinct and poignant contrast to Chubb’s sterile sophistication, 
McCorkle’s artistic language is “a private patois, woven together from 
English, Hokkien and Bahasa Melayu” (238); his poems are fuelled by 
what Sarah calls “nasal passion.” Both the idiosyncratic syntax and the 
“rudeness” of his poetic form speak to the singularity of McCorkle’s 
existence, and his artistic achievement isn’t intellectual, but elemental: 
“He had ripped up history and nailed it back together with its viscera 
on the outside, all the glistening green truth showing in the rip marks” 
(235). Upon reading the poems, Sarah sees her challenge as an editor 
as a matter of preserving McCorkle’s bile, maintaining the punctures 
and fractures that make the poems great. She tells herself, “I [can] not 
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tamper with it. I [can] not try to civilise it, or argue with it, or straighten 
out the shocking disconnected bits” (246). In short, she must refrain 
from putting it “in order;” she must refuse to bring her learnedness to 
bear upon it. Here, disconnection and ignorance are poetic strengths. 
By his own admission, McCorkle is “a poet who does not know the 
names of things” (151), yet he is not hampered by his inability to clas-
sify and systematize according to existing standards. Instead, he learns 
and/or invents names and constructs massive journals detailing the flora 
and fauna of Malaysia, a self-directed project that surpasses “the ‘nature 
notes’ of any poet who ever lived” and amounts to “one of the greatest 
projects of Malaysian natural history” (238). McCorkle clearly wants to 
know things (he’s no noble savage), but, as his trying living conditions 
make clear, he has no desire to be worldly or sophisticated. He tells 
Chubb, “I have been called a genius […] and perhaps that is why I have 
very little experience of the world. What I know and what I don’t know 
are difficult to categorise for people like you—who understand so much 
of the world and so little about me” (80).
Here, as elsewhere, worldliness becomes a counter-credential; genius 
is specifically at odds with a self-conscious cosmopolitan understanding 
of (or even engagement with) worldliness and high culture. After spend-
ing a lifetime adhering to, and enforcing, aesthetic standards, Sarah is 
disarmed when she finally encounters McCorkle’s great poems because 
they are so far “outside the laws of taste and poesy” (235), free from both 
overdeveloped fealty to “tradition” and from the fashions of the day. 
Although Chubb trades heavily on the things that “any educated person 
would know”(39), these are the very things that separate the learned and 
self-conscious aesthetics of Chubb, Sarah and Slater on one side, from 
McCorkle on the other. Schoene derides the “wearing [of ] cosmopoli-
tanism like some kind of protective shock-proof overcoat” (27), yet this 
is exactly what Chubb and Sarah’s self-conscious sophistication amounts 
to. Not surprisingly, “shock proof” and “disconnected” tend to travel to-
gether. When “good taste” and learnedness come to be regarded as uni-
versally applicable standards and credentials, they become aligned with 
what Dharwadker calls the “easy portability of self-sufficient theory” (3) 
in contemporary critical discourse. In each case, there is a sense that the 
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possessor of these credentials is justifiably insulated against/protected 
from calamitous exposure to the specific conditions of individual cir-
cumstances, and this failure and/or refusal to contend with ground-level 
conditions has a sterilizing effect on both art and criticism. 
V. “We are all familiar”: On who knows what, and where
In the space remaining, I’d like to briefly investigate how this type of 
“cosmopolitanism from above” might operate in the wider discourse of 
cosmopolitan studies. In particular, I want to demonstrate the degree to 
which some cosmopolitan thinkers duplicate the procedures of Carey’s 
hapless sophisticates, how universalized assumptions that there are 
things “any educated person should know” continue to thrive, and, per-
haps perversely, how these assumptions speak to the still underexamined 
partiality of cosmopolitanism’s purported inclusiveness.
In “Cosmopolitan Reading,” K. Anthony Appiah opens by recogniz-
ing the massive shift, more properly the dispersal, in academic cultural 
repertoire that has accompanied the “opening up” of the canon over 
the last several decades: “at […] Harvard law school fifty years ago,” he 
writes, “if anyone had thought to bring up The Tempest, it would not 
have been thought proper to admit to ignorance of its plot” (198). These 
days, he says, it’s acceptable not to know Shakespeare, and the fact that 
a student can be forthcoming about her ignorance of “reputably central 
authors” (199) reflects both the heterogeneous nature of contemporary 
syllabi, and the fact that, for many, there is “no ground for an argument 
that there are books that everyone must have read” (201). As a result, 
he claims that, “in ten years [of ] coming to the English Institute [there 
have been] very few papers that required one to arrive with a real famili-
arity with any literary text” (199). 
Anyone who’s been on the conference circuit would find it tough to 
contest this claim, but the implications are pretty serious and still under-
recognized. The declining significance of what were once called primary 
texts can be read as a further de-localizing of critical discourse, a de-lo-
calizing that duplicates the political, social and economic procedures of 
globalism. Armed with a universalized theoretical discourse, we are like 
Chubb in our disinclination for local affiliations and affairs; we don’t 
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need to know the weather conditions in the little neighbourhood rep-
resented by any individual text, just the generalized climate dictated by 
the jetstream that is contemporary theoretical discourse. The frequency 
with which we hear phrases of the type, “I haven’t read the book, but 
…” at conferences ought to give us more pause than it generally does. 
Appiah, it seems, isn’t much bothered by any of this and makes the 
standard claim that efforts to resist “the appeal of hierarchies among 
texts” (201) work both to broaden the scope of what people read and to 
increase the number of people reading. “One thing I know for sure,” he 
says, “is that many, many more people are having conversations about 
literature than did so forty years ago” (200).
I find the inclusiveness of Appiah’s argument appealing, but it can’t 
disguise the fact that Appiah continues to traffic in solid, if different, 
notions of both canon and community. Appiah’s essay itself reflects an 
implicit and underacknowledged set of fairly elitist assumptions, a clear 
debt to the types of things “any educated person would know.” A gradu-
ate student might well get along without The Tempest, but it seems clear 
that s/he would be expected to arrive with the ubiquitous and port-
able theory outlined above. We might not need to know Shakespeare 
anymore, but could we get along without Freud, Derrida, Foucault, 
Irigaray, Spivak, Said? Don’t the “many, many” conversations Appiah 
imagines to be taking place still depend on a common vocabulary com-
manded by a still-insular, still-elevated, community? Without any irony 
that I can detect (and in the middle of an argument about expanding 
understandings and suspending territorialized notions of cultural legiti-
macy), Appiah claims that “we are all familiar with the skeptical antiu-
niversalism of Dick Rorty” (215). 
In this sentence, skeptical antiuniversalism yields to a decidedly uni-
versalist “we” that assumes a very great deal about what everybody thinks 
and knows. It’s a “we” that goes very well with the “you” that Sarah uses 
to open Carey’s novel. The clearly “in-group” nature of “Dick” (as op-
posed to Richard) Rorty only adds to the smug and self-congratulatory 
tone. In the remainder of his essay, Appiah also assumes that “we” all 
have a reading knowledge of Greek, German and French; he also can’t 
resist adding the “[sic]” when he quotes from Sterne, distancing himself 
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from the accusation of ignorance the same way Sarah seeks to distance 
herself from the vulgarism of her own heart. Both want to contain the 
indecorous and emphasize their erudition. Demonstrating the vastness 
of their respective understandings, both Sarah and Appiah problemati-
cally seek to convey “a sense of mastery” (Hannerz 239) over cultural 
territories; both also seem to fear exposure. With Ulf Hannerz, they 
seem to think of cultural attainment as a means of bringing the world 
to heel, as an assertion of authority. As “one’s understandings have ex-
panded,” Hannerz writes, “a little more of the world is somehow under 
control” (240). Schoene rightly reads this as an effort to subdue the 
world and protect oneself in a shock-proof overcoat. 
The same kind of argumentation underlies Bruce Robbins’ interpreta-
tions of both The Remains of the Day and, to a lesser extent, The English 
Patient. In each case, Robbins’ zealous pursuit of his larger theoretical/
political point tends to obscure the specific practices and procedures 
of uniquely stipulated literary neighbourhoods. Attempting to defend 
cosmopolitanism against what Robert Pinsky dismissively describes as 
“the village of the liberal managerial class” (Secular 87), Robbins argues 
that it is possible for cosmopolitan academics to embrace both “plan-
etary expansiveness of subject matter [and] unembarrassed acceptance 
of self-interest” (Secular Vocations 181). Basically, cosmopolitanism need 
not be completely altruistic to do good in the world. I think such a posi-
tion is both fair and defensible, but Robbins’ mode of argumentation 
and his programmatic, under-nuanced reading of Ishiguro’s novel aren’t 
exceptionally convincing examples of what a sensitive and productive 
cosmopolitan criticism would look like. Indeed, Robbins’ argumenta-
tive and interpretive strategies point to exactly the kind of ivory-tower 
isolated “we” that Pinsky derides. 
In his response to Pinsky, “The Village of the Liberal Managerial Class,” 
Robbins perceptively links the respect and influence of the aristocracy 
of the past with “professionalism now” (23). In so doing, he connects 
two previously divergent notions of cultural authority, one based on 
birth, the other based on acquired skills/practices. Clearly, professional 
proficiency (which can be attained) is a more inclusive category than 
aristocratic status (which can’t), but Robbins’ veneration of a cliquish 
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kind of international cosmopolitanism doesn’t escape classist implica-
tions; in fact, it champions them. When he approvingly imagines The 
English Patient in terms of “a bonding via literary quotations ranging 
from Herodotus to Stephen Crane [to] Paradise Lost” (24) and when he 
applauds a “postpatriotic love, an eroticizing of professional knowledge” 
(26), he participates in precisely the kind of self-congratulation that in-
forms the conversations of Sarah, Chubb and Slater. It’s exactly the kind 
of dubious position Chubb exploits when he fills the McCorkle poems 
with “many classical allusions” (32) to appeal to the pretentiousness of 
the Australian literary elite. This type of bonding operates through an 
explicit process of exclusion. “Who cares about poetry?” Chubb asks, 
“Fifty people in Australia? Ten with minds you might respect” (46). 
Bonding according to literary allusions, with its transparent elitism, 
isn’t just a “very partial universalism [that] involves solidarity with some 
people outside the nation, not solidarity with humanity as a whole” 
(Robbins, “Village” 29); it’s both partial and hierarchical, a means of 
separating a sophisticated “we” from a benighted “they,” a way of deter-
mining who “knows better” and who needs improvement. Those who 
recognize Herodotus are in the community; those who don’t are out. 
It’s hard, of course, for me to make an argument that Robbins is an 
insensitive reader while positioning myself as a champion of inclusive-
ness, but such is the nature of this type of discussion. It’s not quite a race 
to the bottom in an intellectual or ethical sense, but it is, and perhaps 
ought to be, a race to the ground, an effort to step “out of narrow, self-in-
carcerating traditions of belonging” (Schoene 21) and see what different 
territories look like and how they feel. The professionalized cosmopoli-
tanism Robbins proposes is exactly the kind of self-incarcerating iden-
tity that ruins Christopher Chubb’s life; Chubb’s self-identification as 
poet, and his desire to associate only with those who recognize his classi-
cal allusions, might well be post-national, but it ushers in an even more 
narrow, less inclusive community, a community so small that he can’t 
imagine more than ten people in Australia as members. Moreover it 
produces the kind of simultaneously elitist and petty conversations we 
witness when Chubb and Slater nearly come to blows about whether 
“ulcerated” is a more elegant term than “ulcered” (109). 
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Robbins’ affection for these kinds of conversations leads to some very 
strange assumptions about what professionalism means. Although he 
briefly accepts that “something [odd] is clearly going on if the term 
professionalism” (28) can be applied to both butler and diplomat in The 
Remains of the Day, his blanket affirmation of the professional fails to 
fully recognize the widely divergent nature of the activities and the people 
he groups under the single term. Despite weak protests to the contrary, 
Robbins basically attempts to conflate (or at the very least closely com-
pare and mutually validate) an international diplomat’s professionalism 
with a butler’s. In so doing, he overlooks (even as he seems to note) the 
presence and/or absence of self-directedness that each profession entails, 
and the different trajectories different lives and professions follow. It’s 
like conflating a tourist and a vagabond because they both move around 
a lot. It’s true that Ishiguro’s butler treats his profession with utmost seri-
ousness and sincerity, but the profession itself is service; the butler func-
tions as an extension of the master’s will. He suspends his selfhood for 
“the wishes of [the] employer” (Ishiguro 149), a fact made clear when 
Stevens overlooks his personal tragedy to do the work of the house. In 
very sharp contrast, the diplomat extends his will onto the nation. He 
exercises a kind of extraterritoriality, while the butler empties himself 
out. Crudely, Stevens does what Darlington wants; England does what 
the diplomats want. That Robbins can overlook this in his zeal to defend 
professionalism--and by extension cosmopolitanism-- as basic goods is 
highly problematic, and speaks to a disconnection from both ground-
level reading of texts, and, I fear, from any experience with the ground-
level existence of people outside the liberal managerial class. As with 
Slater’s many travels, Robbins’ version of professional cosmopolitanism 
involves a member of the elite claiming the privilege of being “one of 
the guys” (“We’re all professionals…”), even though his subordinates 
can never afford to lose sight of the functions of both positionality and 
hegemony. As Chubb puts it, “you own us.”10 
VI. Conclusion: In Praise of Tactility
In his very interesting book on the role of theory in contemporary crit-
icism, Valentine Cunningham argues against what he calls the “stock 
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responses” (88) theory often produces and argues for “meaning-full, 
pleromatic, hands-on textual encounters” (167). For Cunningham, 
reading is a matter of “tact,” of tactility, of “gentle touch, caring touch, 
loving touch” (155), the type of contact that can’t happen if one ar-
rives in a shock-proof overcoat. Here, I’ve tried to approach Carey’s 
novel with this kind of tact. I’ve tried to feel it and follow its con-
tours and resist the impulse to subordinate it into my overarching 
scheme. I’ve also tried to demonstrate (in as quiet a way as possible) 
that cosmopolitan reading might productively be regarded as a mode 
of close reading, that cosmopolitanism’s openness to the specificity 
of new territories ought to include the specificity of individual story 
worlds. Along the way, I’ve attempted to demonstrate the shortcom-
ings inherent in any cosmopolitanism that reads as an extension of 
globalism, that operates in terms of a self-sufficient theory that oc-
cludes differences and perpetuates a kind of sophisticated abuse. Both 
inside Carey’s novel and the wider discourse that surrounds it, success-
ful reading and life strategies must involve a direct engagement with 
things that move on the ground if they are to avoid the pitfalls of an 
overdeveloped and disconnected reliance on the stuff “any educated 
person would know.”
Cunningham invokes Iris Murdoch’s largely overlooked assertion that 
the novel is a form which, at its best, provides “‘free’ characters built out 
of respect for ‘the otherness of the other person’” (qtd. in Cunningham 
149). Accepting and engaging with the otherness of other people is 
cosmopolitanism’s great and laudable goal, and most people who think 
about cosmopolitan aesthetics rightly applaud the novel as a form with 
the capacity to demonstrate (without domesticating) difference. Still, 
both My Life as a Fake and cosmopolitan discourse in general seem to 
show how difficult it is to suspend our affiliations, not least our alle-
giances to the theoretical models from which our claims to learnedness 
and good taste are derived. This being the case, we must avoid the fate 
Sarah sees so clearly in Chubb’s manifold social, political and aesthetic 
failures. We must avoid a cosmopolitan aesthetics that is “grotesque and 
self-deceiving in [its] love of ‘truth’ and ‘beauty’” (Carey 33).
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Notes
 1 This type of assertion of cultural supremacy is what Hage describes as “sophisti-
cated abuse” (185), the abuse the learned and enlightened inflict on their cultural 
inferiors. Despite the fact that it is generally mobilised in defense of multicultur-
alism, hybrydity, etc., sophisticated abuse is “ultimately conservative” (185).
 2 My Life as a Fake spans most of the period regarded as postmodern, and deals 
explicitly with the legacy of High Modernism. It depicts events that occurred in 
1972, recollected and narrated in 1985. The novel itself was published in 2003.
 3 Despite their conservative intentions, McAuley and Stewart did not occupy 
a dominant position in Australia’s cultural discourse. That position was com-
manded by an apparently edgy but functionally orthodox European modernism. 
 4 Indeed, she regards the literary hoax as a bad faith gesture, not a telling revela-
tion. For Sarah, the main point of the Malley/McCorkle poems is that the hoax-
ers have “preyed upon the best, most vulnerable quality an editor has to offer 
[…] the hopeful, optimistic part […] so you might find […] a great, unknown 
talent” (21).
 5 Sarah is also, of course, a daughter of the English aristocracy. If we remem-
ber Robbins’ link between the aristocratic cosmopolitanism of the past and the 
current cosmopolitanism of professionalism (“Village” 23), then we see Sarah’s 
simultaneously aristocratic and professional cosmopolitanism as doubly legiti-
mized.
 6 Indeed, when the employees of Sarah’s hotel wish to make Chubb disappear, 
they destroy his suit when he sends it out to be cleaned, pulling it apart at the 
seams. Without it, they know, he can never return.
 7 Because Chubb isn’t always able to track McCorkle’s movements, there are times 
when McCorkle’s whereabouts are unknown.
 8 It’s also an example of the productive life-strategy Müller endorses when he de-
scribes people and cultures that are “animated by a set of universalist norms and 
enriched and strengthened by particular experiences and concerns” (96).
 9 Schoene doesn’t endorse this construction of the cosmopolitan, but recognizes 
it as significant to many modes of cosmopolitan thinking and cosmopolitan 
behaviour.
 10 Robbins’ argument that Lord Darlington’s plan to lessen German debt repay-
ment might actually have saved the world from WWII seems similarly disin-
genuous. Darlington’s apparently transnational affection for the Germans is not 
motivated by any positive force, even if it might have produced some residual 
good. The possibility that Darlington might have been right in supposing debt 
relief would help avoid war does precisely nothing to mitigate the partiality and 
unseemly nature of his classism and anti-Semitism. If I only want male children 
and murder female ones as soon as they’re born, I suppose I am incidentally 
helping to control population growth and lessening the burden on the environ-
ment, but that doesn’t make it a good idea or me a good guy.
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